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FORTY years ago the late Professor Ernst Freund observed: "Living under
free institutions we submit to public regulation and control in ways that would
appear inconceivable to the spirit of oriental despotism.... ." The fundamental
changes in the relation of individual to community, announced by Professor
Freund in his characteristic fashion, stem from socio-economic changes which
inevitably and profoundly affected the criminal law and its administration. For
the past century and a quarter the proliferation of statutory regulatory offenses
has been perhaps the most important factor producing change in the char-
acter of our criminal law and the theory of criminal liability. This development
has left a legacy of problems, many of which are not only unsolved but large-
ly unexplored.
Mr. Edwards' important study, Mens Rea in Statutory Offences, illumi-
nates many of the modern problems in the area. The book is one of that dis-
tinguished series appearing under the auspices of the University of Cam-
bridge's Faculty of Law with the general title English Studies in Criminal
Science. It should be conceded at the outset that the Edwards volume is a
technical discussion of a rather esoteric branch of the law. Something over
three-hundred fifty cases and over two hundred statutes are cited and dis-
cussed, the great majority of which are decisions of English courts or acts of
Parliament. The author organizes these voluminous materials by discussing
in order judicial interpretation of each of several characteristic and recurring
terms employed in the English statutes-such epithets as malice, wilfully,
knowingly, permitting, causing, fraudulently and the like. A chapter is devoted
to the problem of vicarious criminal liability, and a discussion of negligence as
the test of criminality is offered. But if the discussion is technical, it is neither
narrow nor sterile. For Mr. Edwards carefully relates his discussion of the
particular to the general. While his objectives include giving assistance to the
English practitioner in the field, he is even more concerned with issues of
legislative policy. Nor does his preoccupation with English materials destroy
the significance of the study for American readers. Most of the problems are
wholly typical of our own, and some of the legislative devices employed in the
English statutes are worth our consideration and, perhaps, adoption.
1. FREUND, STANDARDS OF A-mERicAN LEGISLATION 21 (1917). He added: "[I]t is
well known what deep-seated repugnance and resistance of the native population to the
invasion of their domestic privacy and personal habits English health officers in India have
to overcome in order to enforce the sanitary measures necessary to prevent the spread of
infection or contagious disease."
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As one looks over the legislative materials reviewed in this volume or turns
the pages of the statutory compilation of any American jurisdiction, he cannot
fail to be impressed by the enormous bulk of penal regulations which have
entered the law and the range of human activities sought to be affected or
controlled by these prohibitions. The killing of domesticated pigeons, the fenc-
ing of saltpeter caves against wandering cattle, the regulation of automobile
traffic, and the issue of daylight saving versus standard time have all, at one
place or another, been.made problems of the criminal law. No doubt, much of
this represents the inevitable price of the new role which, perhaps through
necessity, we have thrust upon government. And yet, although Mr. Edwards
does not pose the question, there is surely reason to inquire whether such
broad resort to criminal liability as the regulatory device is necessary or in-
evitable. The demand for regulatory legislation first reached flood stage in
the last half of the nineteenth century, when administrative law was in its early
period of development and sophistication. The resort to criminal penalties, in
many situations, may have represented the only apparent means of accom-
plishing the regulatory purposes. This necessity has abated with the passage
of the years and the development of alternative regulatory techniques. But as
one surveys much modern legislation, he is often struck by the obvious lack
of ingenuity displayed in devising sanctions. It is clear that criminal penalties
are often included in such legislation almost as a matter of course. Typically,
there is no adequate consideration of their necessity or utility in the particular
regulatory situations. I am told that when the draftsman of one of the most
intricate pieces of regulatory legislation enacted by Congress in the New Deal
period was asked what considerations underlay the inclusion of rather severe
criminal penalties in the law, he answered: "I don't recall; I can only say they
got into the draft late one Saturday afternoon." I cannot vouch for the
accuracy of the story, but it fairly reflects an attitude which pervades much
legislative activity in the field.
The insouciance which has often characterized legislative consideration of
criminal provisions in regulatory statutes has had a variety of unfortunate
consequences. One of the most important is the deplorable quality of statutory
language encountered in the area. Curiously, the most frequently committed
sin against decent standards of draftsmanship cannot be explained or excused
by the existence of any very serious difficulties in expression. The problem is
well illustrated by the provision involved in the case of Cotterill v. Penn.2 Sec-
tion Twenty-three of the Larceny Act of 1861 3 reads: "Whoever shall unlaw-
fully and wilfully kill, wound or take any house dove or pigeon under such
circumstances as shall not amount to larceny at common law, shall, on convic-
tion ..... " It is apparent that this section, typical of hundreds of American
2. [1936] 1 K.B. 53. The accused, whose vision was temporarily impaired by brilliant
sunshine, shot and killed a house pigeon, although he intended to kill only wild birds that
had been damaging his crops. These facts were held not to constitute a defense under the
statute.
3. 24 & 25 VicT., c. 96.
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statutes, is afflicted with an inherent ambiguity. Does the term "wilfully"
import nothing more than a purpose to "kill, wound, or take" a bird which
turns out to be a house dove? Or does it require a purposeful killing of a bird
by the accused with knowledge, at the time of killing, that the bird is a house
dove? The distinction is important because it is the difference between an
absolute liability and one founded on the requirement of mnens rea. Surely, it
requires no great skill in the use of language to place the question beyond all
doubt.4 Draftsmanship of the sort involved in Cotterill v. Penn has plagued
the courts for many years, and as Mr. Edwards' volume illustrates, has pro-
duced a body of doctrine, the parts of which are often inconsistent and irre-
concilable. Each year new statutes are placed on the books which contain the
same avoidable difficulties and obscurities. This may represent more than care-
lessness; it may sometimes involve a more or less conscious delegation of
difficult policy problems to the courts. But this can only be regarded as an
abdication of legislative responsibility. For if a legislature chooses to exert its
authority so as to place its citizens under peril of criminal conviction and loss
of property or liberty, it is surely under obligation to determine and state with
clarity the conditions under which such disabilities may be imposed.
While Mr. Edwards discusses a wide range of legal questions associated
with regulatory legislation, the central theme is the problem of absolute lia-
bility. Shall a provision, employing any of the variety of statutory terms used
to import a state of mind, be interpreted to require only a purpose to commit
the forbidden act, or must the prosecution also establish knowledge or purpose
relating to all the circumstances or consequences of the conduct which are made
essential elements of the offense? The author discovers, in considering the
judicial interpretation of many of the statutory epithets employed in English
legislation, that some cases take the latter view thereby requiring proof of a
mens rea, and some do not. This diversity of interpretation he relates most
closely to the attitude of the individual judge toward the nzens rea require-
ment and the time the case was decided. He finds that the turn of the century
was the period of greatest judicial tolerance of absolute liability. Perhaps un-
fortunately, Mr. Edwards refuses to attempt identification of the factors in the
intellectual environment of those years which produced the attitude he describes.
It is fair to say that, in his analysis of the English cases, Mr. Edwards pre-
sents a reasoned and forthright defense of the mens rea requirement. His
proper hostility toward absolute criminal liability is grounded on considerations
both of moral principle and expediency. At one point he directs attention "to
the serious danger of the criminal law falling into disrepute if both the legis-
lature and the courts allow statutory offences to be administrated with scant
regard for the doctrine of mens rea."5 The incongruity of imposing the social
condemnation of criminal conviction on those who acted in ignorance of the
4. These matters are well discussed in Remington & Helstad, The MIental Element in




facts which rendered their conduct illegal is a moral perception at least as old
as Aristotle. To be sure, penalties attached to such legislation are likely to be
light, and in many cases (but by no means in all) conviction for such an offense
may involve the accused in no serious loss of community esteem. But experi-
ence has shown that absolute liability, once admitted, is a principle difficult to
manage; and there is the danger of its ill-considered extension to areas in which
the issues are of a much graver sort. Moreover, one wonders whether the
association of the notion of criminality with complete moral innocence is not,
in the long run, an obstacle to the accomplishment of the important general
purposes of a system of criminal justice.
And there are further considerations bearing on the issues of absolute lia-
bility which are not detailed in Mr. Edwards' analysis. As mentioned above,
one of the striking aspects of regulatory legislation is the extraordinary range
of conduct sought to be controlled by imposition of penalties. When such far-
reaching legislation entails criminal liability despite total absence of criminal
purpose, every member of the community, however respectable and law-abid-
ing his disposition, becomes a potential offender. As a result the persons upon
whom the effective administration of criminal justice depends for support are
encouraged to oppose the official agencies rather than to cooperate with them.
That these factors have adversely affected the relations of the public to the
police, even in England, is asserted in the report of at least one Royal Com-
mission.6 There is a further point. The doctrine of men rea is founded not
only on considerations of abstract morality but of political morality as well.
The rule which limits the imposition of criminal liability to conduct which is
not only objectively dangerous but which is accompanied by guilty knowledge
or purpose constitutes an important practical regulation of the relations be-
tween state power and individual liberty. It is a restraint that ought not to be
lightly abandoned or seriously attenuated.
7
6. "The result is a feeling of hostility or state of friction, which is foreign to the nor-
mal relations between the police and the public, and a disposition to withhold that assist-
ance and co-operation in the suppression of other offenses which the public has generally
been ready to afford." REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON POLICE PowERs AND PRO-
CEDURE No. 3297, pp. 81-82 (1929). Similar problems are perceptively discussed by an
American writer. SMITH, POLICE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES 72-74 (1949).
7. The importance of the mens rea requirement as a limitation on state power may be
implicitly attested by the elaborate efforts made in some totalitarian regimes to prove that
those convicted of essentially political crimes possessed the guilty mind. Thus after an
accused was convicted of "incitement to boycott and incitement to war" in the Soviet zone
of Germany for repeating a story appearing in the western press to the effect that the
Soviet proposed to depopulate the strip along the border between the east and west zones
to provide a buffer, the court is reported to have said: "The defendant, who describes
himself as a peace-lover, knows all the problems of the day which dominate our hearts. He
knows that we have only one struggle, the establishment of German unity in order to give
the world peace camp yet another formidable partner against imperialist warmongers. He
therefore also knows that nothing is ever done by the Soviet Union that stands in con-
tradiction to these great aims. But the creation of such a zone would represent a prepara-
tion for war and would be just as dangerous a threat of war as a divided Germany is."
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In view of Mr. Edwards' sturdy defense of the principle of inens rea, it may
come as a surprise to note his advocacy of the test of negligence, or mere in-
advertence, as the basis for criminal liability in at least some statutory offenses.
The author makes no contribution to clear analysis, I believe, when he sug-
gests that mere negligence, involving no knowledge, purpose or even awareness
of peril, can properly be treated as fulfilling the requirements of mens rea.8 But
he seems clearly correct in suggesting that negligence might often be incor-
porated as the statutory basis for liability in many regulatory situations in
which the only feasible alternative is assumed to be absolute liability. The pro-
posal may be rendered more palatable to the dubious in many cases if the
burden of proof of establishing due care is placed on the defendant as an
affirmative defense. Mr. Edwards is also resigned to accepting a limited scope
for the doctrine of vicarious criminal liability. He asserts, however, that the
proper rationale of the English cases does not involve the principle of respon-
deat superior, but rather a theory of non-delegable duty owed by the licensee
who turns over the care and control of licensed premises to a subordinate who
in turn commits or permits the commission of the offense. I doubt that most of
the American cases lend themselves to this explanation. The author points out
that in many English statutes involving criminal liability of employers for
the acts of servants, the rigors of vicarious criminal liability are mitigated by
a device known as the "third-party procedure." Such a provision permits ex-
culpation of the employer who proves his due diligence in avoiding the com-
mission of the offense after bringing the actual offender into the proceedings
and establishing his guilt. 9 The device is interesting, but the propriety of making
a defendant prove the guilt of a third party in order to gain his own acquittal
appears at least questionable. Here again the best solution may be simply the
recognition of due diligence on the part of the employer as an affirmative de-
fense.10
It is not a criticism of this book to remark that it does not tell all that one
would like to know about English regulatory statutes and their administration.
But it can be said without qualification that the author has made a substantial
contribution to the study of an important and strangely neglected area of public
policy. We shall be further in his debt if his work inspires further inquiry,
both in this country and abroad.
FRANcIs A. ALLENt
(Emphasis added.) INTERNATIONAL COMM. OF JURISTS, JUSTICE ENSLAVED No. 7, p. 14
(1955).
8. P. 206.
9. See, e.g., Truck Amendment Act, 1887, 50 & 51 Vicr. c. 46, § 12(2).
10. Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(4) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1956) : "In any prose-
cution of a corporation or an unincorporated association for the commission of an offense
... it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that
the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the
offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission .
TProfessor of Law, University of Chicago.
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